Waheenie wrote on 12/14/10 at 11:39:41 am pst:

Interesting. Can you relink the video? Do you have more info on the incident?

lowPro79 wrote on 12/15/10 at 08:49:25 am pst:

got the video to load this time - here's the victims's report - 2nd Creek Headwall Slide Berthoud Pass Colorado 12/8/10
This report is a synopsis of the avalanche incident my partner and I were involved in on the morning of December 8th, 2010 on the Second Creek Headwall of Berthoud Pass.

This incident really begins on December 7th after hearing positive reports from friends who had skied the headwall on Monday December 6th. On Tuesday December 7th, myself and 4 others from the Fraser Valley skinned into the 2nd Creek Drainage and onto the ridge line of the 2nd Creek Headwall with the intention of skiing two shots to lookers right of Hour Glass. On our ascent we made note of what appeared to be some slough debris to lookers left of where we intended to ski, likely as a result of cornice movement.

Once there we dug a pit on a protected east facing aspect just above the line that we intended to ski. Compression test results showed a moderately reactive layer about 12 inches deep of fresh snow which had fallen over night sitting on top of a consolidated layer about 12-14 inches deep. Below those two layers was a much more consolidated mid pack which all sat on top of 4-5 inches of typical continental base facets. The snow depth at this location was 60 inches deep. To the best of my recollections, the top layer failed at CT18 with Q2 characteristics while the the next layer failed at CT23 with Q2 characteristics as well.

We discussed how the top layer was likely to slough with us as we skied and that while unlikely, if the second layer did release, that a rather large hard slab avalanche would be the result. With that in mind and knowing that the lines we intended to ski had a number of safe zones to ski close to we opted to ski the face. After two runs of perfect knee deep turns and plenty of high fives, our group returned to the highway. Aside from the slough movement we acknowledged earlier, our skiing on the face produced no sloughing, whoomphing or cracking. The lines that we skied contained estimated pitches up to 35 degrees at the top of the face which leveled down to between 25 and 30 degrees across the apron.

On the morning of December 8th, one of the members of our group from the day before and I left the Current Creek parking lot intending to ski Corner Pocket on our way to the zone we had skied the day before. Knowing that the temperature was supposed to rise we started skinning at 7:30 with the intention of skiing as much as we could before the temperature forced us to leave. On the skin up we acknowledged that wind appeared to have moved some snow around overnight and would potentially factor into our decision making. We skied Corner Pocket under bluebird skies and found similar conditions to the day before with no snow movement to be found at all on our descent. As the sun began to warm the basin up we moved quickly up the ridge line with the intention of skiing a couple of chutes to the lookers left of Hour Glass.

Once at the top we really had no ideal place to dig a pit without spending a lot of time exposed. That combined with rising temperatures and pretty detailed knowledge of the snowpack gained from the amount of time we each spend in this area, we geared up quickly and discussed route options. Winds and temperatures were rising... it was time to go.

From the ridge line, we both voiced our concerns about the lack of visibility the tail-gunner would have as the first person skied so we opted to ski individually to an island of rocks a few turns down the spine leading into the chutes we were going to ski. At those rocks we discussed two things: Our concern about the South East facing rollover that was receiving a lot of sun and wind loading, and the routes we would take leading into our respective lines. We agreed that my partner would ski to a high point of rocks to confirm that he was in the right location and then ski his chute fast (likely with little to no turning as he exited out towards the murrain). I got into position, gave my partner the okay to ski and watched intently as he made turns down the face. I saw him slow up trying to find his route as he approached the high point we had acknowledged at which point I saw everything above and around him rip out and wrap around both sides of the spine. My partner edged in and clung to the side of the high point as blocks of snow tugged away at him and flushed down and out into the murrain. Once everything settled we discussed options for him to get out of the hang fire with my partner making the call to move quickly and punch out to the mellower bowl to the south. After seeing him reach a safe point way out on the murrain, I essentially made a single diagonal ski cut across the SE face to a very mellow apron and wrapped around to the north to rendezvous with my partner.

Concluding thoughts (in no particular order):
-After replaying this situation in my mind countless times, I've personally concluded that our key mistake was neglecting to read the pocket that slid for what it was. While we were comfortable putting some pressure on the layer we had seen approximately 2 feet below the surface, this pocket held all of the ingredients for getting that layer to pop. The pocket would be characterized as an east facing, convex rollover which approached 40 degrees, primarily unsupported down the slope and held at the top by sparse trees/shrubs.
-Warming was likely involved in this incident.
-We misdiagnosed the pocket as a result of primarily being concerned with route finding by that point in the line. Our main avalanche concern was focused on the SE facing rollover that dumped off to our right.
-This incident is a perfect example of how route planning should never be neglected in the avalanche equation and if/when you make an oversight, it could save your life.
-The layer that failed is exactly the layer discussed in the CAIC's Front Range forecast on December 9th
-Another partner and I observed this same layer with similar test results on an ENE aspect at 11,300 ft on November 17th. On that day we concluded that it was likely a surface hoar layer developed from cold, cloudless nights around the first of November.
-Judging by this layer's continued persistance, it will likely become a significant problem as storm cycles continue to roll in.
-Interestingly enough, the photos indicate that the majority of the movement on the second layer was isolated to that one pocket. It's difficult to tell exactly what was going on through the chute of the looker's right portion of the slide but the lookers left appears to have held up a little better once the hillside supported the snow pack better further down the hill.
-As is evidenced by the video posted here: YouTube - berthoud pass avalanche skier ability and the use of fat/rockered skis should also be a factor that is more heavily discussed in today's world of avalanche forecasting. My partner made a very quick and skillful kick turn that may have been the most important kick turn he's ever made. The ability to move quickly through dangerous terrain using newer fat skis combined with a rider's comfort with high speeds is also something that can limit your exposure to avalanche danger. My escape route is evidence of this. Had I been in a position where I needed to make a number turns off of the face, I would have put myself and my partner in greater danger as I exited.
-I checked the CAIC report at 7:00 AM before we left the house, no report for that day was posted at that time.

WarPigSinFin wrote on 12/15/10 at 10:25:35 pm pst:

That slide looks warm, wet, and heavy. Homeboys got slush sticking to his ski tips before he even starts the line.

That type of terrain is meant to be skied on cold, stable, mid-winter days... preferably second tracks... or in spring.

Glad to see this guy stopped where he did and made it our OK. We've all been there... back on the horse!